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Abstract—The secure command & control (C&C) of mobile agents 
arises in various settings including unmanned aerial vehicles, 
single pilot operations in commercial settings, and mobile robots 
to name a few. As more and more of these applications get 
integrated into aerospace and defense use cases, the security of the 
communication channel between the ground station and the 
mobile agent is of increasing importance. The development of 
quantum computing devices poses a unique threat to secure 
communications due to the vulnerability of asymmetric ciphers to 
Shor’s algorithm. Given the active development of new quantum 
resistant encryption techniques, we report the first integration of 
post-quantum secure encryption schemes with robotic operating 
system (ROS) and C&C of mobile agents, in general. We integrate 
these schemes in the application and network layers, and study the 
performance of these methods by comparing them to present-day 
security schemes such as the widely used RSA algorithm. 
Keywords- Post-quantum secure authentication, Secure Robot 
Operating System (ROS), multi-agent command and control, secure 
communication 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
This paper deals with three major trends in the cyber-
physical systems domain: the increased attack surface of these 
systems due to the explosive growth of Internet-enabled devices 
in the last two decades; the establishment of the Robotic 
Operating System (ROS) as a powerful enabler of robotic and AI 
systems research, and more and more commonly also in 
industrial applications as a quick and reliable way to jumpstart a 
project/product; and the progress in quantum computing 
technologies which poses a potential risk to the security of 
several existing encryption, authentication, and key exchange 
schemes, notably the ubiquitous RSA [1] and similar public-key 
crypto systems. Some sources [2] estimate that the quantum 
computing threat to traditional public-key cryptosystem will  
become significant by 2040, which implies that data and 
credentials need to start being protected a lot sooner to prevent 
store-and-attack schemes. This looming quantum threat to 
traditional crypto systems will impact all aspects of 
communication, storage, credentialing, and the entire lifecycle 
of commercial, industrial, aerospace and defense systems. 
As described later, standard versions of ROS do not provide 
security for its middleware layer, and any ROS instance with 
access to the network where the ROS master resides, can also 
access communication channels including topics and services 
used by other nodes and ROS instances. Although there is a 
growing body of work on adding security to ROS, given 
previous considerations, it is imperative that these solutions 
address post-quantum vulnerabilities. 
Our manuscript is organized as follows. In Section II.A we 
discuss previous work in the area of security enhancements to 
the application and network layers of ROS systems. In Section 
II.B we provide an overview of promising state-of-the art post 
quantum security schemes and their advantages over the more 
widely used authentication and encryption methods in today’s 
world.  In Section III, we discuss our work on integrating 
existing post-quantum resistant cryptosystems at the ROS 
application layer. This enables designers to quickly retrofit 
existing ROS systems to protect a subset of the critical 
communications from attacks by untrusted ROS computers, 
without having to migrate all nodes to a newer/network-secure 
ROS version. In Section IV, we illustrate our work on fielding a 
post-quantum secure scheme by leveraging Secure ROS1 and an 
implementation of a post quantum-secure crypto system. To the 
best of our knowledge, these demonstrations using the 
application and network layers are the first published instance 
of post-quantum secure command & control of mobile agents. 
The relevance to modern and future aerospace and industrial 
systems is clear (e.g. unmanned aircrafts, and safety critical 
industrial processes). Note that our use of ROS is motivated by 
its popularity and the demonstration of post quantum C&C of 
mobile agents can be ported to other applications and settings. 
In Section III.C we present experimental data of running a 
PQS crypto authentication system on an embedded platform and 
show a performance comparison between the PQS 
authentication and the widely used RSA schemes. While some 
PQS schemes can be more computationally demanding than 
traditional systems for comparably-sized keys, they do achieve 
PQS at practical key sizes, while traditional systems could never 
be PQS at any key size, thus rendering any complexity 
advantage inapplicable. In Section IV.C we compare existing 
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IPSec based VPN with post-quantum secure counterparts within 
ROS, and describe its advantages for authorization enforcement. 
Finally, in Section V, we give an overview of some future 
research directions.  
II. RELATED WORK 
A. Security enhancements for Robot Operating System 
ROS has been widely used in the robotics community for 
research and development of a variety of robotic and AI systems. 
ROS was originally aimed at the research community and 
consequently, little or no thought was given to cybersecurity 
considerations. The idea was that ROS-based systems would 
only operate in laboratory-like environments and isolated 
networks that are not connected to the Internet. However, over 
the years, ROS has become increasingly popular in the industry 
with applications ranging from industrial manipulators, sensors 
and device networks to service robots [3]. Thus, it becomes 
necessary to incorporate security mechanisms either within ROS 
or associated system software. 
One solution is to add security in the application layer [4] [5] 
[6]. This work uses a handshake protocol and an authentication 
server along with dedicated ROS node functions to implement 
security measures. These methods, however, exploit RSA and 
AES for authentication. Our work takes the critical step of 
bringing post-quantum safe authentication algorithms to the 
application and network layers of the ROS architecture.  
Other works introduce security mechanisms within the core 
ROS packages, such that the users of ROS do not have to be 
concerned with the implementation of such mechanisms. The 
Open Source Robotics Foundation (OSRF) has developed the 
SROS project [7] that uses TLS to secure TCP channels. Access 
control for topics, services and parameters is provided using 
policies. SROS uses a key-server to generate and distribute 
certificates during an initialization phases. Although it has been 
in development for several years, it has not yet been incorporated 
as a default in ROS and is still highly experimental, with sparse 
documentation.  
Secure ROS, developed by SRI is an approach to secure the 
ROS core on the network layer, in addition to modifying core 
ROS packages for access control. IPSec is used to secure the 
communication channels at the Internet layer.  A YAML file is 
used to prescribe access for nodes, services, and parameters. 
Secure ROS is relatively easy to incorporate in existing ROS 
systems and provides clear documentation for reuse. We, 
therefore, build upon Secure ROS and modify it to use post-
quantum secure communication between multiple hosts.  For an 
extensive qualitative and quantitative comparison of different 
bodies of work in ROS security see [8].  
We propose two different approaches for securing ROS 
using post-quantum secure schemes: one at the application level 
using the open source liboqs [2] library and the other at the 
network layer which is based on an integration of the Secure 
ROS library and a modification of IPSec using quantum secure 
schemes1.  
B. Post Quantum Secure Encryption Methods 
As mentioned previously, modern communication is 
strongly reliant on the RSA algorithm [1] for asymmetric 
encryption. Asymmetric ciphers have a higher computational 
cost when compared to standard symmetric schemes (which use 
the same keys for encryption and decryption of data). However, 
unlike symmetric ciphers, asymmetric approaches do not require 
an a priori exchange of secret keys. Under the asymmetric 
approach, the message for an intended recipient is encrypted 
using their public key. Once encrypted, the message can only be 
decrypted by an entity in possession of the associated private 
key. The standard implementation of setting up a secure 
communication channel involves using an asymmetric cipher to 
exchange keys for symmetric encryption. 
The guarantee of asymmetric encryption is based on the 
hardness of the underlying problem used to generate the keys. 
For example, the RSA algorithm is based on the hardness of the 
integer factorization problem. The public key that is used to 
encrypt messages contains the product of two large primes that 
are uniquely generated. If one were able to compute the 
factorization of the product, it would be easy to generate the 
private key. Thus, the security of RSA relies on the lack of 
efficient solutions for the integer factorization problem.  
The state-of-the-art classical algorithm (general number field 
sieve) for factoring integers is subexponential [9]. Thus, by 
using randomly generated large primes, one can generate secure 
keys. The state-of-the-art algorithm for factoring an integer on 
quantum devices is Shor’s algorithm that has a runtime that is 
polynomial in    ( )  where N is the integer of interest [10]. 
Thus, the emergence of quantum computers poses a significant 
threat to modern implementations of secure communication. We 
note that symmetric ciphers such as advanced encryption 
standard (AES) are also vulnerable to quantum computers. 
However, the impact of quantum devices on these schemes is 
muted. In particular, Gover’s algorithm provides an  (√  ) 
improvement over classical cryptanalysis attacks on symmetric 
schemes. Thus, in a post-quantum world one expects to recover 
the prior level of security by simply doubling the key size. 
The development of post-quantum secure encryption 
methods for asymmetric ciphers has become a very active 
research area. In fact, the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) is presently conducting a competition on the 
development of post-quantum secure ciphers [11]. Potential 
approaches include supersingular elliptic curve, lattice, and 
multivariate based encryption methods. For more details, we 
refer the reader to [11]. Under this competition, implementations 
of lattice and learning with error (LWE) based ciphers are some 
of the most promising entries. 
 Lattice based cryptography [12], relies on the replacement 
of integer factorization by an NP-hard problem defined on 
lattices [13]. The basis to generate any lattice are non-unique i.e. 
one can either use a good “short” basis or a bad “long” basis to 
generate the same lattice. Given a long basis to generate a lattice, 
the problem of computing a short basis (within a constant factor) 
is NP-hard. Thus, one can define a series of problems on the 
lattice that are NP-hard.  Examples include: 
a) Shortest vector problem (SVP): given a norm and a 
basis, the goal is to find the shortest vector in the lattice L 
1 https://www.strongswan.org/ 
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b) GAPSVP: distinguish between cases where the norm of 
the shortest vector is less than 1 or greater than β 
c) Closest vector problem (CVP): Given a vector that does 
not lie in  , find the closest vector in the lattice.  
Note that the above problems have γ-approximation 
versions. The primary reason that lattice based problems are 
particularly attractive for encryption is that they are average 
case-hard as opposed to most problems that are hard in worst-
case [14]. Given the underlying hardness of these problems, they 
are unlikely to be solved by quantum computers in polynomial 
time, and are consequently expected to be quantum resistant.  
Another promising approach for post-quantum secure (PQS) 
encryption is ring (LWE) [15]. In these problems, one has to 
infer the values of   given the results of    +       ( ). In the 
absence of the noise/error term, the problem can easily be solved 
using Gaussian elimination. However, in the presence of the 
noise term, the problem can be shown to be as hard as several 
worst case lattice problems [15].  
Given the activity in the PQS space, there are numerous 
software libraries that implement the various lattice and LWE 
based solutions for post-quantum secure encryption.  In fact, 
multiple lattice based solutions have successfully entered the 
final round of the NIST competition on post-quantum secure 
encryption methods. We explored multiple libraries for 
integration with ROS. In particular, we tested, a) qTesla: a 
family of LWE based PQS digital signature schemes, b) BLISS: 
a lattice based PQS digital signature scheme, c) NTRU: a lattice 
based PQS cryptosystem for encrypting and decrypting 
information [16]. We now integrate these methods at both the 
application as well as the network layers and compare 
performance with respect to state-of-art techniques. 
III. APPLICATION LAYER SECURITY 
The basic idea behind implementing security measures in the 
application layer of the ROS-based system is to prevent the need 
for changing the ROS middleware, and address security as an 
application dependent measure. For instance, in our case we only 
care about verifying the identity of the issuer of motion 
commands before executing them. Hence, we implement a 
signature scheme within our application without data encryption 
as it is not required to keep the content of the messages a secret 
in the given use-case.  
The possible attack vectors on ROS applications range from 
unauthorized publishing and data access to denial of service 
(DoS) attacks on ROS nodes [4]. If an attacker gains access to 
the network, it can easily access the contents published on a topic 
by other nodes and can also publish malicious data on any topic. 
It can also flood topics with garbage data which can lead to 
nodes crashing and denial of service. In the specific scenario of 
mobile vehicle C&C, it is important to verify the identity of the 
issuer of the commands prior to their execution. 
Digital signatures are a standard way of verifying the 
authenticity of the sender using asymmetric encryption 
techniques. A public key infrastructure (PKI) supports the 
distribution of public keys and the identity validation of 
individuals or entities with digital certificates via a certificate 
authority (CA). A CA is a trusted third party that either generates 
a public/private key pair on behalf of an entity or verifies the 
association of an existing public key to an entity. Once a CA 
validates someone’s identity, they issue a digital certificate that 
is digitally signed by the CA (e.g. X.509 certificates) which can 
then be used to verify an entity associated with a public key 
when requested.  
The sender signs the message using their private key and 
sends the message along with the signature. The receiver then 
retrieves the message from the signature using the sender’s 
public key and matches it with the original messages. The 
authentication would fail in the event of a mismatch between the 
public and private keys or message tampering. 
Although we assume that the public verification key of the 
sender already exists in the database of the receiver, a challenge-
response authentication procedure such as the one described in 
[5] can be used to enable registration of new publishers and 
subscribers in the application.  The application-layer security 
framework is depicted in Fig. 1.  
A. LIBOQS 
The Open Quantum Safe (OQS) project is an open-source 
software project for prototyping quantum-resistant 
cryptography, which includes liboqs, a C library of quantum-
resistant algorithms that implements several key-exchange and 
signature schemes [2]. This enables users to experiment with 
quantum-resistant cryptography. Many quantum-resistant 
schemes are also based on mathematical problems that are, from 
a cryptographic perspective, quite new, and thus have received 
comparably less cryptanalysis. The OQS project provides a 
benchmarking platform for upcoming post-quantum safe 
algorithms and aids cryptanalysis. Several projects have used 
liboqs in evaluating the performance of post-quantum schemes 
into new applications that currently use classical algorithms such 
as RSA. The work in [17] identifies two good signature 
candidate algorithms from NIST’s Round 2 list for TLS 1.3 
authentication and compares them to RSA3072. 
In first integration, we use the lattice-based post-quantum 
secure signature scheme called qTesla, in the application layer 
of a ROS-based system. We compare its performance to 
RSA2048 in the same application.  
 
 
 
Figure 1. Framework for testing application level security 
 
B. Demonstration 
We demonstrate our approach using a simple ROS 
application for C&C of a mobile robot from a ground station. 
The ground station in our case is a Linux machine running 
Ubuntu 16.04, Intel® Core™ i5-6200U CPU @ 2.30GHz × 4 
with a 7.4 GiB memory. A Clearpath Jackal AGV (Fig. 2) is 
controlled remotely from the ground station and executes 
velocity commands. To demonstrate the feasibility of using PQS 
signature schemes on lightweight platforms, we use a Raspberry 
Pi Zero W running a 1GHz single-core ARMv6 CPU with 
512MB RAM, as a relay node that performs signature 
verification before conveying the command to the mobile robot. 
If the verification fails, the message is dropped. The Raspberry 
Pi and the Jackal are on a separate isolated wired network, such 
that no malicious entity can send commands directly to the 
mobile robot. Fig. 1 shows the high-level application 
architecture for our approach.  
C. Results and comparison  
We compare the performance of our ROS integration with 
qTesla as the signature algorithm with traditional RSA2048 
authentication. Fig. 3 depicts the average time to sign/verify 
messages using the two approaches as a function of message 
size. To demonstrate the performance on lightweight embedded       
platforms, we performed the same comparison on the Raspberry 
Pi Zero W and found the results to be quite satisfactory given the 
low computation power of the Pi (see Fig. 4). 
We found that although the time to sign/verify for PQS 
signature is longer for larger message sizes (still in the 
millisecond range), it remains comparable to RSA for smaller 
message sizes (up to 100KB). This analysis shows the feasibility 
of using post-quantum authentication in real-time robotic 
applications. Moreover, our implementation on the lightweight 
Raspberry Pi Zero W is promising for applications that have 
restrictions on computational power and resources.  
IV. NETWORK LAYER SECURITY USING SECURE-
ROS 
Adding security mechanisms to the application layer of ROS 
might not be possible if the developers have limited cyber-
security knowledge. The application-level approach requires 
existing ROS nodes to be rewritten to incorporate security 
protocols. While this is not a huge burden for small applications 
that do not have external package dependencies, a more 
transparent solution might be required for complex applications.  
In Section II, we discussed the body of work that deals with 
modifying the core communication infrastructure of ROS to 
incorporate security mechanisms. One such project is Secure-
ROS, which was created by SRI International as a fork of ROS 
that enables secure communication among nodes. The operation 
of Secure-ROS can be broken into two distinct parts: application 
level authorization enforcement, and network level 
authentication and encryption. At the application level, the user 
may specify a set of authorized subscribers and publishers to 
topics, setters and getters to parameters, and providers (servers) 
and requesters (clients) of services in an authorization 
configuration (YAML) file for the ROS master at run time. 
Secure ROS will only allow authorized nodes to connect to 
specific topics, services, and parameters listed in the 
configuration file. It supports both ROSPY and ROSCPP and 
offers simplicity and transparency to the common user by not 
requiring any changes in the application itself. To further protect 
the ROS system against malicious attacks and ensure IP packets 
are not tampered or spoofed, Secure ROS relies on an Internet 
Protocol Security (IPSec) based Host-to-Host VPN to ensure 
secure authentication and encryption. IPSec is a set of open 
standards that ensure secure communication over Internet 
Protocol (IP) networks. It operates at the network layer, meaning 
its effectiveness is not tied to an application. After an IPSec VPN 
is set up, all traffic that match a set of rules defined by the user 
is secured before being sent over the network. This provides a 
significant advantage over application-level encryption since it 
only needs to be configured once for a given ROS system.  
IPSec has two primary modes of operation, namely tunnel 
and transport modes, which can be configured to provide 
confidentiality, authentication, and data integrity checking. In 
tunnel mode, IPSec is used to secure traffic between two 
gateways, such as a router or a switch. This provides the ability 
for two networks to communicate securely with one another, and 
is the most common set up for a traditional VPN solution. In this 
configuration, the identity of the original sender is hidden; only 
the address of the gateway responsible for encryption is visible. 
The downside is that only outbound traffic is encrypted. This 
means that an IPSec VPN running in tunnel mode would not 
provide any means of security from malicious devices that have 
gained access to the internal network. The other mode of 
operation, transport mode, provides the ability to secure traffic 
being sent between hosts; however, it does not hide the identity 
 
Figure 2. Mobile robot used in experiments to demonstrate post quantum secure communication in real environment (left) and in simulation (right) 
of the sender. Secure ROS uses IPSec in transport mode. The 
operation of IPSec can be broken down into four basic steps. The 
first step is to authenticate the identity of the other device. There 
are multiple ways to accomplish this: pre-shared keys, digital 
signatures, public key encryption or external authentication. One 
of the more common being the use of digital signatures via RSA 
certificates [18]. After the two machines have been mutually 
authenticated, they need to agree on a set of rules that dictate 
which encryption algorithms can be used throughout the life of 
the connection. These parameters are defined in security 
associations (SA). For each new connection, a new security 
association must be negotiated and agreed upon by both parties. 
After the SA has been established by the two machines, they 
must exchange the private keys to be used for encryption. This 
is accomplished by the use a Key Exchange Algorithm such as 
IKEv2. Once the two entities have exchanged private keys, they 
can then begin the final step of encrypting traffic using the 
algorithm agreed upon in the SA. 
Secure-ROS provides a set of tools that automatically 
generate IPSec configuration files for each candidate machine 
along with its IP address specified by the user within a YAML 
file. These tools rely on racoon, the default Linux key 
management daemon to generate configuration files that specify 
the encryption algorithms in the SA, a public and private key 
pair unique to each host, as well as the unique public key of other 
hosts to be used for authentication. In its default configuration, 
RSA signatures are used for authentication, IKEv2 for key 
exchange and 3DES for data encryption. After the required files 
are securely transferred to each machine, communication can 
then be performed between the hosts specified in the YAML 
configuration using an IPSec VPN running in transport mode. 
This can be seen as access configuration at machine level, where 
only the hosts specified in the IPSec configuration file can get 
access to the ROS network.  
A. Quantum computing risks to Secure ROS 
The largest threat quantum computing poses to cryptography 
is the ability to exhaust the key space of existing cryptographic 
functions within a reasonable amount of time. There are three 
areas within an IPSec VPN that are most vulnerable to these 
types of attacks: 
 The security of the private key used by each host to 
prove their identity via digital signatures or certificates: 
Once a quantum computer is able to break the private 
key, it would allow a malicious node to impersonate 
another machine on the network, paving the way for 
Man-In-The-Middle attacks and allowing a malicious 
entity to give the mobile agent false commands [19]. 
Secure-ROS uses RSA signatures for authentication, 
which are quantum vulnerable due to Shor’s algorithm. 
 The security of the shared secret key used during 
symmetric encryption to encrypt data being sent over 
the network: Should this get compromised, an attacker 
could decipher the traffic being sent until the keys are 
renegotiated. Secure-ROS uses 3DES which has been 
deprecated in favor of AES as of 2018 and has been 
disallowed by NIST for IPSec VPNs.   
 The security of the private key used by the key exchange 
algorithm to securely transport the key used by the 
symmetric encryption algorithm: Should the key 
exchange be compromised, an attacker would be able to 
decipher the traffic being sent until the keys are 
renegotiated. This bypasses the complexity of the 
symmetric private key, meaning the overall security of 
the encryption algorithm is dependent on strength of 
both the encryption and key exchange algorithms. 
Secure-ROS uses IKEv2 which relies on Diffie-
Hellman key exchange with a modulus group of 1024, 
and can be broken by a quantum computer [20]. 
  
 
Figure 3. Comparison of time to sign and verify for different message sizes for qTesla and RSA signatures on the ground station 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Comparison of time to sign and verify for different message 
sizes for qTesla and RSA signatures on the Raspberry Pi Zero W 
 
B. Integrating Quantum Resistant Algorithms into Secure 
ROS 
Due to the separation between the application level 
authorization enforcement and the network level authentication 
and encryption, it is possible to change the network-level 
security mechanisms of Secure-ROS without modifying core 
ROS packages. As racoon does not support any quantum 
resistant authentication or key exchange methods, we need to 
replace it with a new IPSec VPN solution called strongSwan2 
which supports lattice-based encryption and signature 
algorithms. 
In order to strengthen the authentication aspect of Secure-
ROS, we replaced the RSA signatures with Bimodal Lattice 
Signature Scheme (BLISS) certificates. BLISS is a modern 
cryptosystem conceptualized in 2013 that is projected to be 
resistant to quantum-computing attacks [21].  Akin to RSA, 
BLISS is an asymmetric encryption scheme used to verify the 
identity of a given host. BLISS certificates are handled the same 
way as traditional certificates, except the public and private key 
pair are created using lattice based schemes. 
In order to implement BLISS certificates into the ROS 
network, a self-signed Certificate Authority (CA) must first be 
created on the ROS ground station. StrongSwan comes bundled 
with a public key infrastructure (PKI) tool that allows the user to 
easily generate BLISS public and private keys. The first step to 
creating a CA is to create the private CA key. This key can then 
be used to create a CA certificate which contains the public key 
paired with the private CA key. The certificate is then installed 
on each of the machines on the network. Since the public CA 
key present in the CA certificate can only be used to decipher 
data encrypted using the private CA key, entities on the network 
can confirm the identity of another machine by validating the 
signature of their certificate using the public CA key contained 
within the preinstalled CA certificates. If the machine is able to 
successfully decrypt the certificate, this indicates the certificate 
was signed by the same CA and is part of the trusted network.  
With a quantum resistant method of authentication in place, 
the next point of weakness to address is the security of the 
symmetric encryption method. Fortunately, AES is quantum 
secure [22] when paired with a large enough key size (AES-256 
for medium-term and AES-512 for longer term) and is 
strongSwan compatible.  
In addition to its ability to utilize BLISS certificates, 
strongSwan is also compatible with NTRU for key exchange. 
NTRU is a lattice-based post-quantum encryption algorithm that 
is expected to be quantum resistant [21]. StrongSwan features an 
implementation based on the NTRU-Crypto C source code 
which acts as a replacement for the traditional Diffie-Hellman 
key exchange used in IKEv2. In addition to the added security, 
NTRU also boasts faster computation time over RSA which 
helps mitigate the performance impact of adding encryption. 
C. Security enhancements over Secure ROS and IPSec 
 
After an IPSec tunnel is established, Secure ROS operates 
without impact on the standard work flow. To confirm the 
effectiveness of the IPSec VPN we use two virtual machines to 
communicate with each other over an unsecured network, while 
a third machine acts as an attacker. Without a VPN, the content 
Table 1. Secure ROS authorization configuration for demonstration 
Topic Ground station Monitoring agent Attacker 
Publish Subscribe Publish Subscribe Publish Subscribe 
/command       
/e-stop       
/status       
 
(a)  
 
(b)  
 
Figure 5. (a) This figure shows the Wireshark output from the attacker’s perspective when there is no security mechanism present. Data in the TCP packet sent by 
ground station can be seen by an adversary in plaintext 
(b) This figure shows the Wireshark output from the attacker’s perspective once the IPSec tunnel is created. Traffic is encapsulated by ESP header and underlying 
TCP packet is not visible to an adversary 
of the traffic being sent between the two machines is visible to 
anyone on the network. To illustrate this, we use a simple ROS 
publisher node to periodically send a “hello world” message 
along with a counter displaying the number of messages sent. 
By using the packet capture program, Wireshark, we analyze 
the traffic being sent by ROS without a working VPN. In figure 
5(a) we show the ROS traffic being sent in a TCP packet. By 
digging into the TCP packet, one can see that the message being 
sent to the other ROS node is visible in plain text. 
On the other hand, when the VPN is successfully configured, 
the traffic is encapsulated in an Encapsulated Security Payload 
(ESP) header. The ESP header hides the true protocol and 
underlying data behind a layer of encryption. This means that 
should an adversary intercept a message meant for a robot, they 
will be unable to decrypt the data being transmitted (Fig. 5b). 
IPSec configuration files are used to control the connection 
and specify parameters negotiated in the SA, such as the mode 
of operation and the method of authorization, encryption and key 
exchange. The header contains information that is relevant to all 
connections and the body contains information relevant to a 
single connection. The user can specify which cryptographic 
functions are allowed to be used for different cases. In our 
example, we used a “trap all” method; this means all traffic, both 
in- and outbound, must be first secured through an IPSec tunnel. 
StrongSwan will attempt to establish a VPN for every new 
connection. Normally this method acts as a hindrance since it 
prevents any unsanctioned connections from outside the 
network, effectively blocking Internet connectivity. In our case, 
the robots operating on the network do not need to communicate 
outside the network; thus this limitation is not a drawback. In our 
configuration, BLISS signatures are used for authentication, 
NTRU-192 is used for key exchange and AES-256 is used for 
data encryption. 
Using the IPSec configuration files, depending on the 
application requirements, the security mechanisms can be 
modified. For example, if responsiveness is of a higher priority 
than encryption strength, AES-512 can be changed to use a 
smaller key size by simply changing the parameter to AES-256 
or AES-128. A weaker encryption method can still be quantum 
resistant if the confidential life time of the data is short. It is also 
possible to change the configuration file to only establish secure 
connections when attempting to connect to a given range of IP 
addresses. This would allow for the robot to maintain Internet 
connectivity, if needed, while still communicating with the 
ground station via an IPSec tunnel.  
D. Demonstration details 
To demonstrate how the security infrastructure described 
above applies to command and control of mobile agents, we used 
a Gazebo simulation environment (Fig. 2) with a simulated 
mobile robot. The different components of the application are: a 
ground station, a mobile agent, a monitoring agent, and an 
attacker present in the network. We verified the security 
mechanisms at both the application layer (provided by secure 
ROS) and the network layer (provided by strongSwan). The 
authorization configuration provided to Secure ROS ensures that 
only the ground station can give velocity commands to the robot 
and the monitoring agent can issue emergency stop commands. 
Unlike standard ROS (no security), these rules enhance security 
by blocking unauthorized commands (see Table 1) even from 
trusted machines, limiting the attack surfaces in the event that an 
attacker gains access to a trusted host. Moreover, in the event 
that an attacker gains access to the network, any IP packets 
coming from their IP address will be rejected if they are not 
authenticated with the secure IPSec tunnel. Fig. 5 shows the 
system behavior with and without network layer security, 
respectively. 
 
E. Results and comparision  
We compare the performance of our Secure ROS and 
strongSwan integration against the default IPSec 
implementation currently used with Secure ROS, as well as with 
a system with no security. The purpose is to show the 
performance impact of using post-quantum schemes for network 
layer authentication and encryption. We use BLISS signatures 
along with NTRU key exchange algorithms and compare the 
results with RSA and IKEv2 used in IPSec. We compare the 
performance impact with respect to varying ROS message size 
and message frequency. The analysis is done on virtual 
machines running Ubuntu 16.04, Intel i7-7700HQ @ 2.60GHz 
with 1GiB memory. The comparison of average message 
frequency for different security schemes is shown for varying 
Table 3. Time taken for initial key exchange and authorization 
 
Table 2.  Performance impact of different levels of encryption with 
respect to message size and frequency 
 
message sizes and target frequencies in Table 2. Note that this 
empirical data reflects the effect of using AES-256 and SHA-
512 (quantum resistant) in our application as compared to 3DES 
and SHA-256 used in standard IPSec. The effect of post-
quantum schemes on the authentication and key exchange is 
reflected in the connection setup time shown in Table 3. Our 
post-quantum implementations are orders of magnitude faster 
than standard IPSec, which is a promising result. 
 
V. FUTURE WORK 
In our application layer security implementation, we focused 
on the authentication aspect of our C&C application with a pre-
defined set of nodes. In future work, we wish to enhance the PKI 
management infrastructure such that new trusted nodes can be 
added to the ROS network at run-time. We also wish to add 
encryption to the application layer to ensure messages that 
contain sensitive information are protected. Secure ROS 
currently uses plaintext YAML configuration files which can be 
manipulated by malicious entities without being detected. We 
plan to alleviate this issue by using certificates. The post-
quantum safe security schemes that we used in this paper are still 
in their active development phase and will reach standardization 
in the coming years. We will continue to monitor their 
development and integrate the most reliable and efficient 
algorithms in our framework, enabling security in future ROS 
systems. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
Given the vulnerability of popular asymmetric ciphers to 
Shor’s algorithm, the rapid development of quantum computing 
devices poses a significant near-term threat. Thus, the 
integration of post quantum secure methods with existing and 
emerging uses is of paramount importance.  In this work, we 
have demonstrated the integration of post-quantum secure 
encryption schemes such as lattice and learning with errors-
based encryption with the robotic operating system. We 
demonstrate the above by integrating various PQS encryption 
libraries with ROS. This enables the secure command and 
control between the ground station and mobile agents. In 
particular, we integrate these schemes in the application and 
network layers. The former as a means for retrofitting existing 
solutions and latter for the design of new ones. We find that PQS 
schemes integrate successfully with ROS, and provide an 
attractive mechanism for dealing with the impending threat of 
quantum computers. We also find that the performance of PQS 
schemes is not a limiting factor and often desirable. 
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